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Employees' Benefit Plans
By Edwin M. Sieradz*
Pension and other employees' benefit plans are nothing new to the
American scene. Progressive employers have long found it wise to solve
the business's superannuation problem, and to tie their employees closer
to the organization, by providing means by which deserving long-term
employees may receive regular payment, after retirement, usually beginning at the age of sixty-five or under, for the rest of their lives, and
under which such employees would somehow share in the business'
profits. Such payments, together with expected social security (old age),
and private insurance benefits, might well assure a comfortable old age
to a man who otherwise might .not be able to accumulate more than necessary to just "get along."1
Such plans were, however, on the whole confined to large business
enterprises because the problems above referred to were and are more
burdensome there than in small and medium sized organizations. It is
therefore of interest to note that at present an increasing number of such
smaller enterprises have become interested in pension and other employees' benefit plans.
The reason is that there are now more businesses making fair profits
than ever before; that the Revenue Act of 19422 introduced or clarified
certain tax advantages to be gained from qualified plans; and that qualified plans are not violative of the wage stabilization law. A trust which
meets with the requirements of the revenue act is tax exempt, the employer's contribution to a qualified plan is a deductible expense,, and no
taxable income accrues to the employee from such a plan until benefits
are actually received. Although payments to a pension trust amount in
effect to postponed salary payments, they are not within the prohibitions
of the wage and salary freezing orders.
A plan may be so organized as to require the interposition of a
trust. It may, on the other hand, be so arranged as to dispense with a
*LL.B., 1930, J. D.. 1933, University of Berlin; LL.B., 1942, University of
Denver.
'lnteresting material relative to the foregoing may be found in Sen. Rep. 610,
76th Congress, at 64.
"Public Law 753, 77th Congress. second session. approved October 21. 1942.
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trust agreement, for example by direct purchase of annuities from an
insurance company. 3 However a benefit plan be organized, it requires a
"lawyer's touch." The following pages are intended to give a survey,
and not more than that, of the law involved.
I.
A short summary of the tax situation of employees' benefit plans
prior to the Revenue Act of 1942 is in order for two reasons:
First, the 1942 act is remedial in scope 4 and is designed to avoid the
tax avoidance possibilities of the old law. Under established rules of
interpretation, a remedial law should, if possible, be so construed as to
remedy the abuses against which it is directed. 5
Secondly, the new Section 165 I. R. C. dealing with the tax exemption of employees' pension trusts and similar plans, and the new
Section 23 (p) I. R. C. dealing with the deductibility of employer contributions to such plans, will not go into effect as to plans existing on or
before September 1, 1942, until the first taxable year beginning after
December 31, 1942.6 Until then, therefore, the old law applies.
The law on this subject, prior to the Revenue Act of 1942, has
been thus summarized: 7
(1)
Key men trusts are condemned by the Commissioner, approved by the Board, and tolerated by Congress through disregard after
the problem was submitted to it.
(2)
The fact that the trust does not qualify under Section 165
does not deprive the employer of right of deduction for amounts paid
into it if the amounts qualify as reasonable compensation.
(3)
If the trust does not qualify under Section 165, the right to
deduct lump sum payments over a 10-year period is denied.
(4) Even though the trust does not qualify under Section 165,
the amounts paid in by the employer are not income to the employee
when paid in.
(5)
Even though the trust does not qualify under Section 165,
it is not taxable on the amounts paid in by the employer or employee,
but failure to qualify deprives it of its right to exemptions as to other
income received by it.
Under the new law, as under the old one, three questions must be
distinguished:
3

As to contracts combining annuities with life insurance features see infra, part II,

second paragraph.
'See R. E. Paul's statement before the House Ways and Means Committee, H. R.
Hearings, Revenue Revision, 1942, Vol. 1 87, 1004 and 5. and Vol. III 2405, ff.
'See 59 C. J. 2405, ff.
'S. 162 (d) of the 1942 revenue act.
'Washington Tax Talk (1942) 20 TAX MAGAZINE 432, at 435.
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(1) When is a trust forming a part of an employees' benefit plan
tax-exempt?"
(2)
When are employer contributions to such trusts or other
employees' benefit plans deductible expenses to the employer?0
(3)
When are the employer's contributions to an employee benefit plan taxable income to the employee? 0
1. A trust forming part of a stock bonus, pension, or profitsharing plan is, according to Section 165 (a) I. R. C. tax-exempt under
the following conditions:
(a)
At least seventy per cent of all permanent employees must be
eligible to participate in the plan, and at least fifty-six per cent of all
permanent employees must actually participate.
Permanent employees are those who have been employed by the
present employer for more than a minimum period set up in the plan
(not in excess of five years), who are customarily employed for more
than twenty hours in any one week, and who are employed more than
five months in any calendar year.'
(b) When the plan does not meet these requirements it may still
qualify if the classification of benefits is found by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue not to be discriminatory in favor of stockholders, offi12
cers or supervising employees.
(c) The principal and income of the trust must be solely for the
benefit of the employees, and it must be legally impossible to use the
fund for any other
purpose as long as there are liabilities due employees
3
under the plan.
In Section 165 (a) (5) I. R. C. it is expressly stated that a plan
shall not be discriminatory merely because it excludes employees whose
total wages or salaries are $3,000 or less. 14 Certain other limitations of
a plan are also said not to be necessarily discriminatory. 15 Since in an
average business few employees other than "key-men" will earn more
'Dealt with in S. 165 (a) I. R. C.
'Dealt with in S. 23 (p) I. R. C.
'Dealt with in S. 165 (b), (c) and S. 22 (b) (2) (B) I. R. C.
"S. 165 (a) 3A I. R. C. Persons who do not meet these conditions, though
actually employed, are not considered "employees" for the purpose of computing participation
requirements under the act. Reg. 103, S. 19: S. 165 (a) (3)-1 I. R. C.
12
S. 165 (a) (3) (B) I. R. C.
"'S. 165 (a) (2) I.'R. C. The trust instrument must affirmatively make it impossible for the non-exempt diversion of the fund to occur, but the settlor need not relinquish all power over the trust. Reg. 103, S. 19: S. 165 (a) (2)-1 I. R. C.
"See SS. 165 (a) 5 and 1426 (a) (1) I. R. C.
13e. g. Limitation to salaried and clerical employees S. 165 (a) (5) I. R. C.
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than $3,000 a year, it may be doubted whether the purpose of the 1942
revenue act to remove discrimination will be achieved to this extent.'
2. The deductibility of employer contributions to employees' benefit plans was formerly determined by Section 23 (a) I. R. C., relating
to business expense, and Section 23 (p). Under the new Section 23 (p)
(1) I. R. C. the deductibility of employer contributions to such plans
is governed by Section 23 (p) I. R. C. to the extent that such contribu17
tions are "reasonable" under Section 23 (a) I. R. C.
Two situations must here be distinguished: Contributions to plans
meeting with the requirements of Section 165 (a) I. R. C. as to nondiscrimination and coverage and contributions to plans not so qualified.
(a)
Employer contributions to a plan qualified under Section
165 (a) I. R. C. are deductible under Section 23 (p) I. R. C. if they
meet with the following requirements:
(A) As a rule, employer contributions to a plan may not exceed
five per cent of the aggregate payroll of participating employees during
a taxable year.
(B)
Employer contributions in excess of five per cent of the
aggregate payroll may be allowed when
(aa) both past and current service credits are determined in terms
of a level amount at retirement age, or in terms of a level percentage of
average income prior to retirement, 8 or
(bb) when an employer contributes an amount equal to the "normal cost of the plan" as determined by the Commissioner, plus, if past
service credits are provided by the plan, an amount not in excess of ten
per cent of the cost which would be required to completely fund such
past service credits as of the date they are included in the plan.'"
These exceptions sound more complicated than they really are.
For the first one (level amount, or level percentage) I shall give the
example set out in the Senate Finance Committee report on the 1942
tax bill:
The actuary may determine, on the basis of a study of all
relevant data * * * that if the employer contributes yearly 4%
of the total compensation of the employees for current service credits and 3% for past service credits, making a total of 7%, the trust
may be expected to have sufficient funds to pay all the pensions
"Reg. 103. S. 19: S. 165 (a) (3)-I I. R. C. enunciates, however, a "theory
of integration" which requires that total benefits resulting to each employee under the
plan and under the Social Security Act be reasonably correlated.
"Reg. 103. S. 19.23 (p) (1)-I.
" .23 (p) 1 (A) I. R. C.
'"S. 23 (p) (1) (a) (iii) I. R. C.
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provided by the plan. * * * The Committee feels that for such
cases the employer's contributions are a proper deduction, even if
inexcess of 5 %.
Under the second exception, the "normal cost of the plan" is the
amount which it would cost to buy annuities in such amounts as are
earned by the employees by that particular year's service. And the additional ten per cent of cost to "fund past service credits" is simply ten per
cent of the "single premium" which an insurance company would charge
to guarantee the payment of such annuities as are provided under
the
20
plan for services rendered prior to the time the plan goes into effect.
Section 23 (p) (1) (A) (4) is new. This section allows the employer to carry over contributions made in excess of the foregoing limitations to succeeding taxable years in which contributions do not reach
the maximum amount allowed.
(b) If the plan does not qualify under Section 165 (a) I. R. C.,
then the employer may deduct contributions to it only if the employees'
rights to, or derived from the employer's contributions are "non-forfeitable. "21
Under what circumstances employees' benefits are "non-forfeitable" within the meaning of the act is not entirely clear. Definitions of
the term, as used in statutes requiring certain non-forfeitable benefits in
life insurance policies, are not of great help. They define the word as
meaning "not 22subject to forfeiture," which is about what one would
have expected.
The term must be interpreted by correlating Section 23 (p) with
Section 165 (c) I. R. C., which declares an employer's contributions to
non-qualified plans to be income to the employee only if his rights are
non-forfeitable. Since the minimum right of an employee under such a
plan must be to payments beginning at a certain age, the employee's
right would seem to be "forfeitable" if this can be taken away from him.
But it would not be forfeitable only because the employee's
rights termi23
nate prior to the age of retirement provided in the plan.
3. The income tax situation of an employee participating in an
employees' benefit plan is as follows:
(a)
Where the plan qualifies under Section 165 (a), there the
contribution of the employer is not considered as2 4additional income to
the employee at the time the contribution is made.
"Reg. 103, S. 19.23 (p) (1) (A) -4.
IS.23 (p) (1) (D) I. R. C.
'See Adams v. Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co.. 231 Mo. App. 881. 105 S. W. 2d 64
(1937).
'Reg. 103, S. 19.165 (c)-1.
"'For one exception, see infra, part II, second paragraph.
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If a participating employee leaves the employer, withdraws from
the plan and receives a cash payment before retirement age, the amount
he receives in excess of the total amount of the employee's contribution
(if any) is reportable as capital gain from assets held for more than six
months, which makes the gain fifty per cent taxable.
When the employee attains retirement age and pension benefits are
paid, the amounts received are reportable by the employee as if the benefits were paid under an annuity contract, the consideration for the benefits
being the amount (if any) contributed by the employee. If the employee
did not contribute to the plan, the entire amount of income received is
to be included in his gross income. If the employee did contribute to the
plan, then three per cent of the total amount of his contribution is to be
included in his gross income. The balance is exempt until the exempt
amounts equal the total amount the employee contributed to the plan.
From then on the entire amount received is to be reported as gross inome.25

(b)
Where the plan does not qualify under Section 165 (a)
I. R. C. the employer's contributions are considered income to the employee when made, but only if the employee's rights under the plan are
non-forfeitable. As to the meaning of "non-forfeitability" the same
uncertainty heretofore mentioned prevails.
Employees' benefit plans follow essentially identical rules, whether
a pension or profit-sharing plan is in question.26 The following additional rules, however, apply with regard to bonus and profit sharing,
and "combination" plans:
An employer may contribute up to fifteen per cent of the aggregate
payroll of participating employees during a taxable year under a bonus
and profit-sharing plan. Employer contributions in excess of fifteen per
cent may be deductible in any subsequent year if over-payment contributions are offset by reduced employer contributions in such subsequent
years. 2"
When a bonus or profit-sharing plan is combined with a pension
plan, the employer may contribute up to twenty-five per cent of the
aggregate payroll of participating employees during a taxable year.
II.
Sections 165 and 23 (p) I. R. C. deal with the tax situation of
pension, bonus, profit sharing, and similar plans only. They do not
affect the question of deductibility of premiums paid by an employer on
life insurancecontracts on the lives of employees. In this respect the law
"S.165 (b) with S. 22 (b) (2)
S. 23 (p) (1) I. R. C.
IS. 23 (p) (1) (C) I. R. C.

(B) 1.R. C.
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has not changed. Such premiums can, therefore, be deducted by the
employer as business expenses if they are in the nature of additional
compensation, if the total amount of compensation is not unreasonable,
and if the employer is not the beneficiary under the policy. But the
premium paid by the employer is, in marked distinction to employer
contributions to qualified
benefit plans as heretofore discussed, taxable
2
income to the employee .

Under a pension plan, contracts combining retirement income benefits with life insurance protection may be provided for the employees.
For such a situation it is now provided that so much of the premium as
is, according to actuarial computation, paid 29for the life insurance protection will constitute income to the employee.
Employer contributions to group insurance plans, too, are deductible business expenses, but do not constitute taxable income to the employee. 0
III.

Employee benefit plans, as herein outlined, must furthermore heed
the wage and salary stabilization law. A short survey of these rules, as
affecting employee benefit plans, follows.
Employer contributions to pension plans qualifying under Section
165 (a) I. R. C. are not considered unauthorized wage or salary increases. 31 It follows that employer contributions to pension and other
plans not qualifying under Section 165, supra, are unauthorized wage or
salary increases so long as not approved by the W\ar Labor Board or the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Stabilization Unit. 2 Payments by
the employer
of premiums on regular life insurance contracts "on the
life" 33 of an employee are not considered unauthorized salary or wage
increases where the amount paid is deductible business expense under
Section 23 (a) I. R. C. and does not exceed five
per cent of the em34
ployee's salary, excluding the premium payments.
'S. 24 (a) (4) 1. R. C.: Reg. 103, S. 19.24-3; Adams v. Commissioner, 18
B. T. A. 381 (1929): Danforth v. Commissioner, 18 B. T. A. 1221 (1930).
'Reg. 103, S. 19; S. 165 (b)-I I. R. C.
'Reg. 103, S. 19.22 (a)-3.
31
Wage Stabilization Order, Oct. 3, 1942, Title VI. S. 2; Regulation of the
Director of Economic Stabilization, Wages and Salaries, S.4001, 1 (h) (1).
'Payments into profit-sharing funds may be salary or wage increases and, if so,
require approval by the stabilization agencies.

See ALEXANDER TAX NEWS LETTER,

Aug. 13, 1943, P. 3209.
'This, according to an unpublished letter of A. D. Burford, Deputy Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, Salary Stabilization Unit, refers to whole life policies only, not to
endowment contracts.

Employer contributions to the latter require prior approval of

the stabilization agencies.
'See Regulation of the Director of Economic Stabilization, Wages and Salaries, S.
4001.1 (h) (2).
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If there is any doubt whether the plan is authorized by these regulations or whether approval is necessary, a ruling may be obtained from
the War Labor Board or the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Stabilization Unit, by completing and filing forms NWLB-10 and SSUI, respectively. The War Labor Board has jurisdiction with regard to all
wages and salaries below $5,000, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
as to all salaries above $5,000.35

IV.
Where the employer is a corporation two more sets of rules have to
be observed to make an employee benefit plan safe. I shall deal very
cursorily with both as the law has not been changed recently, and as a
detailed account of either would require a full-length article.
Some plans of this kind may come within the jurisdiction of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.s" The possibility that corporate
minorities might object to a pension or other employee benefit plan must
be considered. A single stockholder has a basis for complaint if the payments under the plan amount to waste of corporate assets.37
In closing, I wish to refer to a few agreements which may aid the
attorney in drafting an employees' benefit plan:
The Socony-Vacuum Oil Company retirement plan, in Senate
Report 610, Seventy-sixth Congress, 193.
The Eastman-Kodak "combination" plan, ibid., 182.
A number of plans may be fond in the mimeographed "Symposium on Pension and Profit Sharing Funds and Trusts," issued by the
Chicago Bar Association, 29 South La Salle St., Chicago, Illinois.
"See

ibid., SS. 4001.2 and 4001.4.
'Compare S. 2 (1) with S. 3 (8) of the Securities Act of 1933.
'See Dix, Retirement Allowance and Pension Plans of Private Corporations, 3 1
GEO. LAW J. 22 (1942).

Public Utility News
We note that the wrapper on our exchange copy of the Washington
Law Review and State Bar Journal carries the address: "Denver Bar
Association, Draper Tramway Co., Denver, Colo."
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Equitable Bldg., Denver 2, Colo.
Advertising, to Dicta, Sydney H. Grossman, Business Manager, 617 Symes Bldg., Denver 2, Colo.
Subscriptions, to Dicta, Fred E. Neef, Secretary, Denver Bar Association, 902 Midland
Savings Bldg., Denver 2, Colo.

Blue Cross Enrollment Now Open
A membership in the Blue Cross Hospitalization Plan is available
to you as a member of the Denver Bar Association. Your participation
is entirely voluntary. However, it is not possible to enroll in the plan
individually, and your bar affiliation serves to make membership available to those anxious to find a means of budgeting for the unpredictable
cost of hospitalization on a sound basis.
To be eligible for Blue Cross membership you must submit your
completed application to the Blue Cross office, 810 14th Street, together
with an annual or semi-annual payment before September 15, 1943.
Applications received before this date will be effective October 1,
1943. Those who delay beyond the deadline established will not be
eligible until the next anniversary date. An application and folder has
been inserted in this issue of DICTA giving the details cf this non-profit
plan. If you are already a Blue Cross member, you need not complete an
application as coverage is continuous from year to year.
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Lawyer's Part in War Main
Theme of State Bar
Meeting
"The Lawyer's Part in the War" will be the chief theme of the
forty-sixth annual convention of the Colorado Bar Association, to be
held Friday and Saturday, September 17 and 18, at the Broadmoor
Hotel in Colorado Springs.
The keynote of the convention will be sounded by the lawyers'
war emergency committee, headed by Benjamin E. Sweet of Denver,
who will report that the present plan adopted by the war department
and the navy in connection with legal assistance to soldiers originated in
Colorado and that another further step in this work has been the inauguration of a property guide, which is described in a previous issue of
DICTA.

The lawyer's part in the world at war will be stressed further
by Mr. Chief Justice Wiley B. Rutledge on Friday evening, when he
will deliver the annual address to the association. Mr. Justice Rutledge,
who is well known to many Colorado lawyers, is a former member of
the Colorado Bar Association and in addition to his duties as justice has
been extremely active this year in addressing bar organizations.
As usual the convention will open Friday morning with the reports
of committees. Among the most interesting of the reports will be those
offered by the committee on the revision of criminal laws and procedure
under the chairmanship of Judge Joseph E. Cook, of Denver, the lawyers' war emergency committee, committee on fee schedules, the committee of uniform code of evidence and the committee on traffic courts. The
committee on revision of criminal laws and procedure has had the draft
of the proposed rules of criminal procedure in federal courts before it
for study and recommendation, and will urge changes in the Colorado
procedure.
In addition to reporting to the convention, Judge Cook is also
appearing before the District Judges Association, which meets on the preceding day at the Broadmoor, chiefly to discuss proposed changes in the
rules of criminal procedure and practice in Colorado.
The Friday afternoon session will open with the present president's
address delivered by Edward L. Wood of Denver. Following this address will be a symposium on war legislation and its effect on property
rights. This subject has been divided into three divisions, which will be
discussed by Royal C. Rubright of Denver, Allyn Cole of Glenwood
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Springs and George T. Evans of Denver. The remainder of the afternoon will be turned over to Major Milton C. Blake, Chief Legal Assistance Officer, J. A. G. D., who will discuss the legal assistance plan in
operation, and will hold a conference with the members of the lawyers'
war emergency committee and the legal assistance officers of the various
army posts, who will also be in attendance at this meeting.
Section meetings will be held on Saturday morning. The County
Judges Association will meet with the section on probate, real estate and
trust law to discuss the necessary revision of the probate and trust codes.
The County Judges Association will be officially represented in the discussion by Judge Henry Bruce Teller, president of the association, and
Judges C. E. Kettering, B. J. Woodcock and William E. Buck. The
program has been arranged by H. Lawrence Hinkley, chairman of the
section. Meeting at the same time will be the District Attorneys Association, which will feature a discussion by Colonel N. D. Franklin, Staff
Judge Advocate, Fourth District, A. A. T. T. C., on "Colorado Military
Policy of Law Enforcement." Also appearing on the same program will
be Bernice I. Reed of the Denver Metropolitan Planning Project, who
will discuss social protection, and Thomas J. Morrissey, U. S. District
Attorney, who will discuss cooperation between the federal and local law
enforcement agencies. The remainder of the program in this section will
be devoted to the subject of the revision of the criminal code in Colorado.
In addition to Judge Cook, discussions will be led by James T. Burke,
John N. Mabry, James N. Noland, A. Allen Brown, and Wm. B.
Paynter. The water section will also meet on Saturday morning to consider part two of the new water code which this section has been drafting
for the past two years. Chairman Malcolm Lindsey will report that
part one of the water code was adopted in its entirety by the 1943 legislature. A. Watson McHendrie of Pueblo will discuss the burden of proof
in transfer cases and abandonment in case of five years non-use. Glen G.
Saunders of Denver will review the work done to date on the Water
Administration Code. Attorneys who are interested in tax matters will
meet on Saturday morning to discuss whether or not it would be feasible
to organize a section on taxation. George T. Evans of Denver will preside at this meeting.
The final sessions of the convention will close with Saturday afternoon's meeting. James P. Economos, who was recently elected chairman
of the National Junior Bar Conference, will open this meeting with a discussion on traffic courts. This subject has been one of the main items on
the program of the Junior Bar Conference of the American Bar Association for this year and Mr. Economos has spent a considerable amount
of time in investigating the problems which grow out of the traffic courts
throughout the country. Following his talk a skit will be presented
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under the direction of Irving Hale of Denver which will feature the differences between proposed uniform code of evidence and the present practice. This skit promises to be both instructive and entertaining. The
final session of the association will then close with the election of new
officers for the coming year. Following a cocktail party given to the
association by the Broadmoor Hotel will be the annual banquet. W. F.
Lilleston of Wichita, one of the bar's most able and entertaining afterdinner speakers, will be the chief speaker at this banquet.
Two vital amendments to the by-laws are up for discussion this
year. One of these amendments would change the annual dues from
$3.00 to $5.00 a year beginning July 1, 1944. The second amendment
to the by-laws would have the effect of abolishing many of the standing
committees and giving to the Board of Governors or the executive committee power to create such standing committees as they might deem
expedient. In addition this proposed change would do away with the
,necessity of having all special committees authorized by the Board of
Governors and would permit the president to appoint such special committees as he thought advisable, subject only to the right of the Board
of Governors to abolish any special committee which it desires.
A program for entertainment of ladies attending the convention has
been arranged and the details of this program will be announced at the
convention. All persons who plan on attending the convention are urged
to communicate with the transportation chairman in their vicinity (a
list of these chairmen appears in the August issue of DICTA) and make
reservations immediately.

Speak Your Piece in Support of the War
A public information program is being launched under the direction of the Public Information Committee of the Lawyers' War Emergency Committee. Gustave J. Ornauer of Denver is chairman and solicits
the names of all members of the bar who will be available for public
addresses and radio broadcasts.
The program will include information to the public via press and
radio regarding the effect of war legislation upon the rights and duties of
citizens and the furnishing of speakers for organizations such as the
American Red Cross.
All lawyers interested in aiding this program are invited to volunteer their services promptly and send their names to Mr. Ornauer, 5 11
Ernest & Cranmer Building, Denver.
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How the State Bar Association
Spends Its Money
When the Board of Governors decided the dues of the association
should be raised from $3.00 to $5.00 a year, subject to the approval of
members of the association, they did so because of the fact that the
income from the present dues was clearly inadequate to continue to
operate all of the functions of the association. At the time the decision
was made to recommend an increase of dues, the Board of Governors
had before it the financial statement of the association for the past several years. This statement showed that unless a substantial amount was
raised each year by members of the association through contribution or
sustaining memberships, it would be impossible to have financed the
activities of the Colorado Bar Association. The Board of Governors
also went over the statement of expenses carefully with the idea of
attempting to cut out any unnecessary expenditures. Few expenditures
were found that could be in any way eliminated and, in fact, it was discovered that the work of most committees was being financed to a large
extent by committee members. While figures are plenty dusty themselves, it was thought that the members of the association would be
interested in a financial statement of the affairs of the association. During the last year the state bar has contributed $474.70 or approximately
$39.56 an issue to the publication of DICTA. This cost represents a
reduction from last year, when DICTA cost the Colorado Bar Association
about $43.68 an issue or $524.09 for the total year. However, against
this saving, the Loose Leaf Service increased in cost nearly $350.00, due
in a large part to the report of the legislation passed by the last legislature. The total cost of the loose leaf service was $1,128.65 as compared
with the cost a year previous of $671.55. However, 1943 was an abnormal year with respect to the expense of the loose leaf service and the
actual cost of printing this service should run approximately $800.00 a
year. In July the association inaugurated the program of sending a
monthly letter to the men in service. This letter will cost approximately
$5.00 an issue. Other main items of expense are the secretary's salary,
which is twenty-five dollars a month, or three hundred dollars a year,
and stationery and stenographic assistance which last year cost $468.31.
The cost of the convention is approximately two hundred dollars in
excess of all receipts. The income of the association is derived chiefly
from dues. For the past twelve months the association has received
$2,804.55 from regular dues. This income has been supplemented by
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contributions and sustaining memberships in the sum of $1,132.00. A
summarized statement of the income and expenses of the association
follows:
Income
Dues
$2,804.55
------------------Annual dues
Sustaining memberships and contribu1,1 3 2 .0 0
tio n s ---------------------------------------------5.00
Miscellaneous income
$3,941.55
Expenses
Dicta
Mailing -Printing
Envelopes Addressograph
Loose leaf service
Printing Mailing
Stationery -War letter --

_$

Secretary
S a la ry - --------------------------Expenses
--Junior Bar Dinner
Miscellaneous expense
Convention expense ......
Unpaid obligations for 1942
Cash on hand

$3,941.55

76.50
315.00
56.74
26.36
1,001.65
27.00
45.09
17.50
300.00
468.31
24.48
94.38
468.19
522.10

$3,443.30
498.25
$3,941.55

C. P. Gehman, who is reporting the forty-sixth annual meeting of
the Colorado Bar Association, will celebrate his fortieth year of reporting the state convention for the Colorado Bar Association. Mr. Gehman,
who is the reporter for Judge George A. Luxford of the Denver district
court, is admitted to practice law in the State of Colorado and is a member of the state bar association.
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A Lawyers' Guide to O PA
BY RONALD J. FOULIS,* MELVIN L. HERTZMAN, 0 AND
BERTRAM

W.

TREMAYNE, JR.'

Continued from August Issues
Enforcement Actions
From time to time, lawyers will represent persons charged with violations of the Rationing Regulations. It may be helpful briefly to indicate and describe the several forms which such charges may take, and, in
general, the procedure which is followed.
A device known as the "warning letter" sometimes, but not always,
is used where circumstances indicate that a violation of a Ration Order
is unintentional and without knowledge of the law. The "warning
letter" calls attention to the violation and informs the person of the
applicable law. Subsequent violations by one who has received a warning letter is more than likely to be wholeheartedly prosecuted.
It is sufficient only to mention suits to enjoin violations of a Ration
Order and criminal prosecutions of violators. These follow the usual
forms and procedures with which lawyers are already familiar.
The Ration Orders themselves contain their own "prohibitions and
penalties," and, in addition, General Ration Order No. 8 sets forth certain uniform prohibitions and penalties which apply to all Ration Orders. Of special interest is section 2. 10, which provides that "no person
shall sell or otherwise transfer, and no person shall, in the course of trade
or business, buy or receive any rationed commodity at a price in excess of
the applicable price established for that commodity by the Office of Price
Administration." This is very important, for it makes the sale or purchase of a rationed commodity in violation of a price regulation subject
to administrative Suspension Order proceedings. While price violations
'Reprinted by permission from the March, 1943, issue of the MISSOURI BAR
JOURNAL.
Footnotes designated by letters have been prepared by Percy S. Morris, Chief Price
Attorney, Denver District Office, Frank E. Hickey, Chief Rationing Attorney, Denver
District Office, and Charles H. Queary, Chief Rent Attorney, Denver Defense-Rental
Area, to indicate changes that have been made since the original article was prepared.
*Chief Price Attorney, St. Louis District Office of Price Administration.
*Rent Attorney, St. Louis Defense-Rental Area, Office of Price Administration.
tAssistant Chief Rationing Attorney, St. Louis District, Office of Price Administration.
$This article is a product of collaboration among the authors, all of the St. Louis
bar; however, Mr. Foulis is responsible for that portion ending with Part I, dealing
with Price Control: Mr. Hertzman for Part II, dealing with Rent Control; and Mr.
Tremayne for Part III, dealing with Rationing.
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may be proceeded against under the Price Regulations themselves, the
Price Acts omitted to establish an administrative procedure for the prosecution of violators, and thus enforcement under the Price Regulations
is limited to court actions. Usually this is sufficient for major violations,
but it is not possible to take every corner grocer into court who sells meat
two cents over the ceiling price. Yet such violations as these, if sufficiently widespread, can break down an anti-inflation program as surely
as do major violations. Section 2.10 provides an administrative enforcement technique for price violations in the sale or purchase of rationed
commodities which, it is believed, will result in better compliance.
Procedural Regulation No. 4, on the issuance of Rationing Suspension Orders, effective February 6, 1943, superseded a temporary regulation on the same subject. This regulation prescribes the procedure for
the issuance of Rationing Suspension Orders, and declares the procedure
for appeals from Suspension Orders issued by War Price and Rationing
Boards in the cases where Boards are empowered to issue them.
One Hearing Administrator, a Hearing Commissioner for each
Region, and presiding officers appointed by the Hearing Commissioner,
are provided for under the Regulation, and these officers conduct the
Suspension Order hearings. Because this procedure is not well known,
it may be profitable to describe it in some detail. Suspension Order proceedings may be instituted by the serving of a "Notice of Hearing" on
the person charged with a violation, who is called the respondent, not
less than three days prior to the date of hearing. Notices of Hearing are
issued by the Regional Attorney, and, in addition to the time and place
of the hearing, there is set forth a statement of the charges against respondent and a statement of the purposes for which the hearing is held.
If the notice is served five or more days before the hearing date, it may
provide that the hearing may be held only after respondent files with
the Hearing Commissioner a request for the hearing and a statement of
the general nature of his defense to the charges. If such action by the
respondent is called for in the Notice of Hearing, but is not forthcoming
no hearing need be held, the charges are deemed to be admitted for the
purpose of the hearing, and the Regional Attorney may present evidence
to the Hearing Commissioner, or presiding officer, relevant to the determination of the effective period of suspension of the respondent. In
such cases and in other "default" cases, the respondent may, at any time
prior to the tenth day after the service on him of a Suspension Order, file
with the Hearing Commissioner a petition for the reopening of the proceedings, explaining why he believes the default should be excused. If
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the Hearing Commissioner grants the petition, a time and place for a
hearing is set, and the Suspension Order is stayed, or set aside.
The hearing must be conducted "in such a manner as will permit
the presentation of evidence and argument to the fullest extent compatible with a fair and expeditious determination of issues raised in the hearing." To such end, it is provided that the respondent may be represented by his counsel, the rules of evidence shall not be controlling, there
shall be afforded reasonable opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses, and the hearing shall be public. Although a stenographic report
of the hearing is taken, transcription may be waived by the parties.
Hearings conducted by a presiding officer are followed by his "advisory
report" to the Hearing Commissioner. Briefs may be filed in support of,
or in opposition to, the advisory report. If the hearing is conducted
before the Hearing Commissioner, either party may likewise file briefs.
If the Hearing Commissioner finds against the respondent, he may issue
a Suspension Order which will prohibit the respondent from dealing in
a rationed commodity, or rationed commodities, for a specified period of
time. If he finds for the respondent, the proceedings are dismissed. A
consent order may be agreed upon by the Regional Attorney and the
respondent but must be approved by the Hearing Commissioner. The
Hearing Administrator, after service of the Notice of Hearing and before
service of the Suspension Order, may direct that the proceedings be
brought before him, after which they shall be conducted in the same
manner as before the Hearing Commissioner. The right of appeal from
a Hearing Commissioner to the Hearing Administrator exists for either
party within ten days of the issuance of the Suspension Order. It is
taken by serving a Notice of Appeal on the Hearing Commissioner and
the other party and by filing a copy of such notice and proof of service
at the Office of the Hearing Administrator. The Hearing Administrator,
on his own motion, may likewise review an order of the Hearing Commissioner. The Hearing Administrator may be petitioned to reconsider
his action in the same way as an appeal from the action of the Hearing
Commissioner is taken.
In some Ration Orders, Local Boards are given authority to issue
what are, in effect, Suspension Orders. For example, Ration Order No.
5C (gasoline) authorizes Local Boards, for specified causes, to revoke
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gasoline ration books and coupons.s In such cases, the appeal which is
allowed must be taken to the Hearing Commissioner instead of to the
District Director, after which the proceedings are conducted in the same
manner as if they had been instituted by a Notice of Hearing. This is
only a brief summary of Procedural Regulation No. 4, and the reader is
referred to the Regulation itself in the event his client is being proceeded
against thereunder.

IV
How to Work With OPA*
STATE (DISTRICT) OFFICES

Colorado is served by one OPA office, which is located on the 6th
and 7th floors of the Kittredge Building in Denver. In the past the
Colorado office has been known as the Colorado State Office. Recently,
however, the name of the office has been changed to the Denver District
Office, but such office continues to have jurisdiction over the entire state
and to have the same powers as before the change of name.
DEFENSE-RENTAL AREA OFFICES

There are five Defense-Rental Area offices in Colorado. The office
of the Denver Defense-Rental Area is on the 7th floor of the Kittredge
Building. The other defense-rental areas are Colorado Springs, La
Junta, Pueblo and Leadville. The Leadville Defense-Rental Area office
is operated as a branch of the Denver Defense-Rental Area office and the
La Junta Defense-Rental Area office is operated as a branch of the Pueblo
Defense-Rental Area office.
SA recent amendment to the Gasoline Regulations has broadened the power of local
boards to revoke or suspend rations after a hearing. Local boards now have this power
in all cases of consumer violations. All revocations or suspensions, however, without
hearing, have been abolished excepting in a case where the Board has mistakenly issued
a ration or mistakenly issued a greater ration than provided in the regulations, on the
facts stated in the application, and a case where the Board has received a certification from
the Office of Defense Transportation that the ration holder has violated ODT regulations.
Special hearing officers in state and district offices have been provided to act for the boards
in certain instances. Where the Board revokes or suspends the ration, an appeal lies to
the Special Hearing Officer, whose decision is final. If the Special Hearing Officer has
had original jurisdiction, an appeal lies from his order revoking or suspending a ration,
to the Hearing Commissioner. The "Government" has no appeal from a decision adverse
to it, whether rendered by a Board, a Hearing Officer, or a Hearing Commissioner. This
is true in the case of an appeal from an adverse decision on an application. In that case.
only the applicant may appeal.
*This subdivision of the article in the MISsOURI BAR JOURNAL has been rewritten
by the three Colorado OPA attorneys named in footnote a on the first page of this
article. It closely follows the wording of the subdivision as it appeared in the original
article with such changes only as were necessary to make the contents of the subdivision
applicable to Colorado instead of to Missouri.
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LOCAL WAR PRICE AND RATIONING BOARDS

In each county of the state is located at least one War Price and Rationing Board which operates under the general guidance and jurisdiction
of the District Office. Many of the counties have more than one board.
Three counties have four boards each. In the City and County of Denver there is only one board, but it is so organized as to distribute its work
among a large number of groups. The members of the boards are volunteer workers appointed from outstanding citizens of their community.
Each board is furnished with a full-time executive secretary and clerical
assistance. The boards administer the rationing regulations in their
counties and perform certain limited functions in connection with the
administration of price regulations.
REGIONAL OFFICE

There are eight regional OPA offices in the United States. Colorado is located in the Seventh Region, the headquarters of which are
located in the Kittredge Building in Denver, Colorado. The other
states in this region are Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. Certain statements required by regulations must be filed with the
Regional Office and some applications for adjustment are required to be
filed with that office.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The national office of OPA is lo~ated in Washington, D. C. All
OPA matters are under the jurisdiction of this office except as delegated
to the field offices.
WHOM TO SEE REGARDING MATTERS ARISING IN
CONNECTION WITH THE PRICE REGULATIONS

The district offices are organized along the following lines. Each
district office is administered by a Director, who is the chief executive or
administrative officer to whom the heads of the following departments
are answerable:
The Chief Attorney is the administrative head of the legal department, which consists of the following branches: The Enforcement
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Division, the Price Division, the Rationing Division, and the Rent Division. These divisions are headed respectively by the Chief Enforcement
Attorney, the Chief Price Attorney, the Chief Rationing Attorney, and
the Chief Rent Attorney.
The Chief Price Officer is the administrative head of the Price Division. In this department are found specialists in various lines of business
and economics. The functions of the department are to advise persons
affected by the price regulations of the existence of the regulations and
to study the effect and operation of the regulations.
The Chief Rationing Officer is the administrative head of the Rationing Division. His functions are similar in the administration of the
rationing regulations to those of the Chief Price Officer in the administration of price regulations.
The Rent Director is the administrative head of the Rent Division.
His functions are similar to those of the Chief Price Officer and the Chief
Rationing 'Officer.
In all matters relating to price regulations, questions should be
directed to either the Chief Price Officer or the Chief Price Attorney,
depending upon the nature of the information desired. Copies of the
regulations may be secured from either department. Interpretations can
be secured only from the Chief Price Attorney, whereas questions involving adjustment of prices or matters involving the impact of regulations
upon business should be taken up with the Chief Price Officer.
In the case of rationing regulations, copies of the regulations can be
secured from the Local War Price and Rationing Boards. The Local
Board is prepared to give information concerning the operation of these
regulations. All questions involving interpretation of the regulations
should be directed to the Chief Rationing Attorney, whereas matters
involving the operation of the rationing regulations and their effect on
persons subject to them should be directed to the Chief Rationing Officer.
All matters arising under the rent regulations should be submitted
to the appropriate Defense-Rental Area Office. Questions involving interpretation of the rent regulations should be directed to the Chief Rent
Attorney in the appropriate Defense-Rental Area Office.
Do not hesitate in any matter to take problems to the appropriate
OPA office. These offices are designed to serve the public and you will
receive a prompt reply to all requests for information or other assistance.
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Colorado Surtax on Income from Oil Royalties
Appeal from a decision of the Director of Revenue of Colorado
asserting an income tax deficiency against a taxpayer.
The director assessed the deficiency for two per cent surtax upon
royalties derived by the taxpayer as the owner of mineral rights in real
property in Texas, Kansas, and New Mexico from which oil and gas
was produced by lessees under oil and gas leases customarily used in the
respective states, and upon revenues received under permits from the
United States, the taxpayer having acquired the rights of the permittee.
The taxpayer, with respect to the property covered by the permits,
entered into leases for developing the production of oil and gas from
the property.
The taxpayer contended that the royalties consisted of income from
tangible property, and that, under the decision in the case of City and
County of Denver vs. Tax Research Bureau, 101 Colo. 140, 71 Pac.
(2d) 809 (1937), was not subject to the surtax. Constitutional questions concerning the validity of the surtax provision in regard to the
income were also raised by the taxpayer.
HELD, that the income received under the government permits constituted income from intangibles, and was subject to the surtax, but that
the income derived from the oil and gas produced from property, the
mineral rights to which were owned by the taxpayer, constituted income
from tangible property, and was not subject to the surtax.
No opinion was given upon the constitutional questions. Martins
v. Cruse, as Director of Revenue, Denver District Court, No. 36783,
Sackmann, J., decided June 11, 1943.
FREDERICK P. CRANSTON.
EDITOR'S NOTE: In the case of Marston v. Cruse, decided in the
District Court of El Paso County, July 6, 1943, the court found that
the income derived from certain oil, gas and mineral leases did not constitute royalties, nor was it income derived from intangible property.
Therefore, it was not subject to the surtax provision of the Colorado
income tax law.

Comments on Real Estate Standards 34 and 35
The committee of the Denver Bar Association on title standards
in promulgating Standards Nos. 34 and 35 concerning the application
of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act to probate on statutory
proceedings for determination of interests in real property and as for the
principal basis for its determination presents the following memorandum
prepared by Golding Fairfield of Denver:
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The Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 and amendments thereto (hereinafter referred to as the act) contemplates proceedings in which "defendants" are designated and against whom a default
can be entered. Our special proceeding for "determination of interests"
does not provide for "defendants" in the ordinary sense of the word nor
is a default entered against any party in interest. The proceeding names
and establishes the heirs of the decedent but takes nothing away from
these heirs. The proceeding does in fact establish and confirm in these
heirs an interest in real property. They can only be deprived of this
interest by their own act. An heir may sell or transfer his interest in the
real property or he may keep it, just as he pleases. If he does sell or
transfer it he must freely and voluntarily execute a deed. No such established heir needs the protection of the act, and it was not intended that
the act should apply to such cases.
Assume, however, that the Federal Act is broad enough to include
a special proceeding of this kind. Is any better title to the real estate
obtained by an attempted compliance with the act? We do not think
so. We think such a compliance unnecessary.
The statute requires that notice in the special proceeding be published. The requirement is for the purpose of notifying any possible
unknown, unnamed heir. This unknown is the only person concerned
with any provision of the act. But, if the act does apply to a special
proceeding of this kind and there should exist an unnamed and unknown
heir, and if it should happen that this nameless unknown was in military service at the time the decree and findings were entered, then his
interests could not be affected either by an attempted compliance with
the act or by no compliance. In either case, when he later obtained
knowledge of the proceeding and his identity became known, he would
have his right under the act to appear in court and have the proceeding
re-opened. In other words, every decree that has been entered or will be
entered since August 27, 1940, is subject to the remote possibility of
there being an unknown heir in military service. Nothing we can do
when such decree is taken can deprive this unknown of his rights.
It might be argued that a defendant in military service would have
less difficulty in re-opening a decree if the act had not been complied with
than if it had been complied with. We do not believe this, but the fact
remains that in either event such defendant would still have a right, a
right to submit his application and make his showing. If a title is to be
objected to as unmarketable because this right exists, the degree of difficulty involved in asserting or establishing the right can have no bearing
on the question of marketability.
Subdivision 4 of Section 200 of the act provides: "that if any
judgment shall be rendered in a proceeding governed by the section
against any person in military service, such judgment may be opened
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upon application made by such person not later than 90 days after he
leaves the service, and he may be permitted to appear in the action and
defend the same provided it is shown that he has a meritorious or legal
defense."
This right to appear in the action exists in all cases where a judgment is rendered irrespective of whether or not the act was taken into
consideration at the time the judgment was rendered or whether or not
an affidavit re military service was filed and an attorney appointed.
All such decrees being subject to this remote possibility of being reopened, we nevertheless affirm that marketability of title is not involved.
In other words, a title to real property based on such decree, properly
obtained under Colorado statutes, is a good and marketable title, because fundamentally any decree or judgment is good without compliance
with the act. It is only when it later appears that a defendant was in
military service that any question arises.
All title examinations are based on a series of presumptions. We
presume delivery, we presume identity of parties, we presume authentic
signatures. We presume that the record is a correct copy of the original.
We presume the truth of recitals in certain instruments. And when a
Colorado court enters a final decree making certain solemn findings of
fact, we presume that those findings are true. When a final decree is
entered naming and finding certain persons as heirs of a decedent we rely
on the findings of that decree. They are prima facie evidence and remain
conclusive until the contrary is shown. Under a decree obtained in the
special proceeding for determining interests the title to real estate remains
good and marketable until it is shown that there is in fact an unknown
heir in military service who has a meritorious claim. If the courts took
the position that such decrees were not conclusive, did not render a title
prima facie marketable, then in the event of a long war a community
could become so situated that it would have no real estate transactions
at all because of a universal objection to marketability.
Furthermore, said subdivision 4 of Section 200 provides: "that
to vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment because of any of the provisions of the act shall not impair any right or title acquired by any bona
fide purchaser for value under such judgment." Consequently, the heirs
so determined in the special proceeding have the right any time to convey
to a bona fide purchaser and his rights under such conveyance can never
be impaired even though an unknown party in interest in the military
service later appears and actually sets the decree and findings of court
aside.
For these reasons we think it unnecessary to attempt to apply the
provisions of the act in a proceeding to determine interests. It was not
done in the other war and for the most part attorneys are not doing it
now. No rule of any local court requires it.
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The Colorado supreme court library has received a bibliography on
current tax problems, in mimeographed pamphlet form, prepared in the
United States treasury department jointly by the office of the general
counsel, office of the tax legislative counsel and the division of tax
research.
The letter of transmittal states that no attempt has been made to
present an exhaustive bibliography on taxation. Instead, the purpose
has been to indicate readily available sources for one desiring an introduction to some of the current tax issues. The scope is limited to federal
tax problems. No reference has been made to exclusively state and local
taxes or to federal-state-local tax relationships.
Attorney General Waives Certain Transfer
Requirements
The attorney general has waived certain requirements of Section 46,
Chapter 85, 1935 C: S. A., calling for a release before transferring assets
of decedents. Where the value of the asset sold or delivered to the person
entitled thereto does not exceed $200.00 in value, no notice need be first
given to the inheritance tax department nor written consent of the attorney general obtained before effecting the transfer. The waiver specifically
applies to stocks, bonds, notes, mortgages, dividends, interest, bank
accounts, certificates of deposit, building and loan accounts or certificates,
and wages or salaries; but has no application to contents of safe deposit
boxes, insurance, annuities, or real estate.
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